Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 197) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 66) include this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The commentaries question why the Rambam mentions lending only to the poor, for as reflected in Bava Metzia 7la and Sukkah 49b, it is also a mitzvah to lend to a wealthy man at the time he needs a loan. Significantly, when stating this concept, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 97:1) also mention the mitzvah of lending to a wealthy person in temporary need.
Kin’at Eliyahu explains that the Rambam could have been referring to the wording used by the proof-text, but would in fact consider it a mitzvah to lend to a rich person in temporary need. Compare to Hilchot Matnot Aniyim 9:15.

Sefer HaMitzvot, loc. cit., states that a person who has not yet faced the shame of asking others for help feels much greater suffering asking for alms than a person who has made such requests previously. See also Hilchot Matnot Aniyim 10:7, which considers giving a loan as the highest form of charity.

Our addition of these bracketed phrases is based on Hilchot Matnot Aniyim 10:3. Note how the Rambam employs this proof-text as a source for harsh criticism against a person who refrains from giving charity.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 234) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 67) include this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 142) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 476) include this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.
In his Hasagot to Sefer HaMitzvot, the Ramban differs and maintains that the intent of the verse is that one may press a gentile for payment, but not a Jew. He interprets the verse as meaning that pressing a fellow Jew for payment violates both a positive and a negative commandment. The Maggid Mishneh refers to this view in his gloss.
The Lechem Mishneh questions the proof-text that the Rambam cites, noting that the verse refers to the nullification of loans in the Sabbatical year.

Sifri on the above verse.

The Even HaEzal interprets this statement as a continuation of the previous halachah. If unwittingly, you demanded payment from a colleague who did not have the means to pay his debt, from then onward you are forbidden to appear before him.

Avot 2:12.

See Hilchot Sanhedrin 20:4, which states:
Similarly, in financial suits, we do not show mercy on the poor. [A judge] should not say: “He is poor and the plaintiff is rich; since both I and the rich man are obligated to sustain the poor man, I will vindicate his claim in this judgment, and he will thus derive his sustenance honorably.” With regard to this, the Torah has warned us [Exodus 23:3]: “Do not glorify a poor man in his suit.”
Indeed, Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 275) considers it to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Movable property is expropriated before landed property because movable property is considered equivalent to money itself. The reason is that it can be sold easily and converted into ready cash. Selling landed property, by contrast, is a more involved matter. Hence it is not considered as cash.

See Chapter 22, Halachah 1, which indicates that the decision whether or not to issue this ban is given to the creditor.

This is a legal device employed by the Geonim to deter the debtor from hiding movable property that he owns and claiming total bankruptcy. We do not, however, require the debtor to take an oath that he does not own movable property [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 101:10)].

In one of his responsa, the Rambam writes that if the only landed property the debtor owns is the house that he lives in, and it is impossible to divide that property, he is allowed to maintain possession.

We do not say that since it is on lien to the prior creditor, it should be left in the debtor’s possession until that loan becomes due. The rationale is, as the Rambam proceeds to state, that since the property can always be expropriated from the creditor to whom it was given, we give him the opportunity to benefit from the property in the interim.

We suspect that he is merely trying a ruse to maintain possession of the articles, and that in fact they belong to him. We assume that “everything in a person’s possession belongs to him.”
The Maggid Mishneh questions: The debtor has the potential to take the article and give it to another person as a present. Hence, based on the principle of miggo - i.e., had he desired to defraud the creditor, he would have had a more effective manner of doing so - his claim should be accepted. In resolution, he quotes the explanation of the Ramban that the principle of miggo is not employed when there is a chazzakah - a presumption accepted to be true - that opposes it. In this instance, the concept that “everything in a person’s possession belongs to him” is considered as a chazzakah that counters the miggo mentioned above.
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 99:1) cites this view, but also mentions an opposing view that maintains that the miggo is accepted. See also Siftei Cohen 99:6, which cites support for the Rambam’s view.

By bringing witnesses; taking an oath is not sufficient.

If in fact the articles were entrusted to the debtor by another person, when he returns he can claim them from the creditor by bringing witnesses who testify that he had entrusted them to the debtor.

From the time the husband or the father gave the articles to his wife or children - or purchased them on their behalf - they became the property of the wife or children. They do not belong to the husband and hence are not on lien for his debts.

Since these garments are more valuable, we assume that the husband or father never gave them to his wife or children as their property. Instead, he always had in the back of his mind that if he becomes pressed financially, he will take them back and sell them.
In his Kessef Mishneh and his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 97:26), Rav Yosef Karo quotes the Tur as clarifying that this ruling applies only to clothes and jewelry that a husband gave his wife. Clothes and jewelry that she brought to the household before marriage are hers alone.
Even with regard to clothes given to her by her husband, the Maggid Mishneh mentions that there are conflicting views, which maintain that a woman’s Sabbath clothing is considered to be her property and is not on lien to her husband’s debts. The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat, loc. cit.) quotes this view.
Kin’at Eliyahu notes that the Rambam’s ruling is based on socio-economic factors, and if they change, the ruling also should be altered. Today, when women are given far greater financial independence, it is unlikely that anyone will consider gifts to them as being given conditionally.

For in Talmudic times - and today as well - jewelry also has financial value and is purchased as an investment. [For this reason, the Rivash (Responsum 301) states that even the opinions that differ with regard to clothing accept the Rambam’s view with regard to jewelry.]

The intent is Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi, who issued such a ruling in one of his responsa.

Seifer Me’irat Einayim 101:15 adds that this ruling applies even if the court knows that he is telling the truth.

See Hichot Matnot Aniyim 8:13. The burden of redeeming the Jew is not the individual responsibility of the creditor, but the obligation of the Jewish people as a whole.

When a person does not have the funds to pay his debt, we do not reduce him to utter bankruptcy. Instead, we enable him to keep his basic necessities.

See Hilchot Arachin 3:14ff.

As stated in Chapter 2, Halachah 2, neither the creditor nor an agent of the court can enter the debtor’s domain to take his property. Instead, it is his responsibility to bring it to the court.

He must bring everything, even those utensils that will ultimately be returned to him.

If foodstuffs are among his possessions, we allow him to keep 30 days worth of food. If he does not possess food stuffs, we sell his other possessions and grant him food (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 93:47).

Based on Hilchot Arachin 3:15, it would appear that this refers to weekday garments, but not to Sabbath or festival clothing, which is more valuable.

I.e., appropriate for his social stranding.

I.e., garments of luxury, that are not necessary for ordinary functioning.

For this is what is appropriate to his social standing.

The food, clothing and mattresses.

Although the Torah obligates the creditor to show consideration for the debtor and allow him to maintain himself, it does not obligate him to extend that consideration to the creditor’s family.

I.e., if he possesses three planes and one awl, we do not sell one of the planes and purchase an awl for him.

The Siftei Cohen 97:15 quotes the Bayit Chadash, who explains that although a court of law would give the creditor the property instead of the woman - nevertheless, if she seizes possession of movable property, it is not expropriated from her. The Siftei Cohen states, however, that this ruling is not universally accepted.

This applies even if she married before the debt was made, and thus her claim receives first priority (Kessef Mishneh). The Nimukei Yosef explains that the creditor’s claim is given priority because his claim originates in Scriptural Law, while that of the wife and children has its source in a Rabbinic injunction. The Lechem Mishneh disputes this explanation, noting that the Rambam also maintains that a woman’s right to her livelihood is granted by Scriptural Law. Instead, he explains that Bava Metzia 114a derives this principle through the exegesis of Biblical verses.

The creditor himself may not have been aware or have had access to this movable property. Nevertheless, when it is taken by the woman and made public knowledge, the creditor can then lodge a claim to it.

As indicated in the previous halachah.