Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day
To’en veNit’an - Chapter 16
To’en veNit’an - Chapter 16
I.e., the field is taken from him even if he brings witnesses who testify that it was his property (Maggid Mishneh).
Sefer Me’irat Einayim 147:1 states that this applies even when Reuven, the seller, does not have witnesses who will substantiate his ownership of the field.
I.e., if the field did in fact belong to you, you should not have taken part in its sale.
Ketubot 109a mentions the opinion of Admon, one of the leading judges of Jerusalem in the era of the Mishnah, who explains that the protester/witness may have desired the sale to be concluded, because the purchaser was a more easy-going individual than the seller. (See Halachah 3.) Hence, he expected him to respond to his protest in a more accommodating fashion. The halachah, however, does not accept this rationalization.
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 147:1) states that this applies only when he signs the deed of sale together with another witness. If he signed alone, he could always claim: “I signed because I know that the signature of one witness alone is worthless.”
See the gloss of the Maggid Mishneh, which states that the Rambam favored the text of the Jerusalem Talmud (Ketubot 13:6) rather than the text in the Babylonian Talmud, which speaks about the protester’s selling of the adjacent field himself and referring to the field in question as “the field belonging to Reuven.”
I.e., when defining the boundaries of another field, he speaks of the field in question as “the field belonging to Reuven.”
I.e., if the field belonged to you, you should not have signed a document that referred to it as belonging to someone else. Ketubot, loc. cit., states that even Admon accepts this ruling.
I.e., a stretch of earth large enough to sow nine kabbim of grain. Nothing smaller than that could be referred to as a field (Maggid Mishneh, based on Hilchot Sch’chenim 1:4).
Even though Reuven was in possession of - and transferred to Shimon - the entire field (Maggid Mishneh).
If, however, he initiated legal action on behalf of the person mentioned in the bill of sale, he can no longer protest his ownership [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 147:4)].
For his responsibility is to authenticate the signature of the witnesses, making sure they are not forgeries - not to focus on the subject of their testimony.
For their purpose is to testify to the truth of the statements in the document.
Levi’s actions reflect a lack of moral integrity, for it is forbidden to save one’s own wealth at the expense of someone else (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 146:39). Nevertheless, there is no legal difficulty with his giving Shimon the advice.
The Maggid Mishneh cites the Rashba as stating that this law applies only when the advisor/protester admits giving this advice. If, however, he denies giving the advice, and afterwards witnesses testify that he did, he is denied the right to protest. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 146:17) quotes this ruling.
I.e., he did not perform an act - e.g., signing the deed of sale - that has legal significance.
From whom it would be difficult to expropriate the field using legal process, and from whom I might suffer reprisals.
And he brings witnesses that Levi benefited from this field for at least one day, as stated in Chapter 15, Halachah 6.
At a minimal price.
Instead, the field is given to Reuven, the claimant. The fact that Shimon did not advance an alibi to resolve the statements of Reuven indicates that it belongs to him.
I.e., since the person in possession does not have witnesses who can substantiate his claim that he benefited from the field for the amount of time necessary to establish a claim of ownership, he is required to surrender the land. One might think that he would also be obligated to pay for the produce he consumed. For since the land is not his, the produce also is not. Nevertheless, he is not obligated to pay for the produce, for there are no witnesses who testify against him and maintain that he is obligated to do so.
I.e., if we believe his claim that he partook of the produce, we must also accept his claim of ownership of the property [Tur; Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 145:3)].
I.e., one might think, as indeed is the case in the following halachah, that the testimony of the witness would obligate the person in possession. This is not so, for the reason explained by the Rambam.
The commentaries cite this law as an affirmation of the Rambam’s thesis that when a person is obligated to take an oath, that obligation remains in force despite the fact that he has a witness who testifies in favor of his position.
The wording of the oath must be chosen carefully so that he is not claiming the field as his, in the process of denying responsibility for the produce.
This applies even if the witnesses intended their testimony to benefit the person in possession of the field. Through their testimony, they established that he benefited from the field for two years. This is not sufficient to establish his claim of ownership, and hence, he must pay the owner for the benefit he derived from the field.
Whenever the testimony of two witnesses would obligate a person to make financial restitution, the testimony of a witness obligates him to take an oath to free himself from responsibility. Nevertheless, for the reasons the Rambam continues to explain, the person is not able to take an oath in this situation.
I.e., a Scriptural oath that he did not benefit from the land.
For he agrees with rather than contradicts the witness’s testimony.
As explained in detail in Chapter 4, Halachah 8, and notes.
Moreover, since the owner does not have a definite claim, the person in possession is not required to take even a sh’vu’at hesset to support his statements. For a sh’vuat hesset is required only when the plaintiff issues a definite claim (Chapter 1, Halachah 7).
For there is no way of clarifying the amount he owes.
Note the repercussions of this ruling in Chapter 12, Halachah 2.
100 zuz.
The plaintiff will then lodge other claims against the defendant that would not ordinarily require an oath, but because of the principle of gilgul sh'vu'ah, could be included in the oath the defendant is required to take (Sh'vuot 31a).
Sh’vuot, loc. cit., quotes this as the proof-text prohibiting all the above and other similar ruses.
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