Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 244) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 60) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

As quoted by the Maggid Mishneh, the Ramban, the Rashba and other commentaries have taken issue with this ruling of the Rambam. Bava Metzia 96b states that a borrower is not liable when the borrowed object is destroyed “because of the work.” These commentaries explain that an object can be destroyed because of the work even if the destruction takes place afterwards. For example, an animal may die “because of the work,” after it has ceased working. Conversely, the fact that an animal dies or an object is destroyed while working does not necessarily mean that it was necessarily destroyed “because of the work.”
The Rivash (Responsum 503) justifies the Rambam’s wording, explaining that the Rambam was not stating a different criterion from that mentioned by the Talmud, but rather defining the Talmud’s ruling. According to the Rambam, it is only when the animal dies or the article is destroyed while the task is being performed that we can certainly know that it died or was destroyed “because of the task.”
The Tur and Shulchan Aruch (Chashen Mishpat 340:1) follow the dissenting views quoted by the Maggid Mishneh.

The Rivash (loc. cit.) explains the rationale for this ruling. Since the lender was informed about the task the borrower desired to perform and still lent out his article or animal, he is responsible for the loss. For he should have realized that this task is beyond the animal’s or article’s capacity. Failing to do so is negligence on his part.

I.e., performed a task other than the one for which he borrowed the animal. Even though the other task is easier, since the lender did not grant permission for his article to be used for that purpose, the borrower is liable [Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.)]. Note, however, Sefer Me’irat Einayim 340:4, which offers a slightly different interpretation.

The Kessef Mishneh notes that the Rambam’s wording implies that even though the borrower deviated from his initial request, for him to be liable, the animal must die in the midst of that deviation. The Kessef Mishneh questions this ruling.

According to the Rambam, the intent of this phrase is literal: “under him” means while he was riding it. This follows the Rambam’s approach that, for the borrower to be absolved, the animal must die when performing the task for which it was borrowed. Thus, if the animal dies when he is not riding it, the borrower is liable.

Also implied is that he did not deviate from the ordinary pattern of working with that animal [Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.)].

See Hilchat Sechirut 3:1, where the conceptual basis for this ruling is explained.

I.e., witnesses who substantiate his claim.

A Scriptural oath, which must be taken while holding a sacred article.

See Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 7:8.

I.e., instead of requiring the borrower to keep the broken utensil or the injured animal and buy a replacement for the owner; all that is required is that he compensate for the difference.

I.e., he pulls the animal after him. This is the kinyan that formalizes his borrowing of the animal (Hilchot Sechirut 2:8). Even if he does not use the animal until later, from the time of meshichah, he accepts responsibility (Siftei Cohen 340:8).
The Tur and the Ramah differ and state that even if the borrower does not perform meshichah, from the time the owner leaves the animal in the borrower’s responsibility, the borrower is required to provide it with food.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 340:4) clarifies that we are speaking about a depreciation in value that is irreversible.

And not because he did not feed it properly.

We do not say that there is a set time for which it is assumed that he lent him the article. With regard to lending money, Makkot 3b states that unless it is stated otherwise, we assume that a loan was given for 30 days, and the lender may not demand payment beforehand. A loan of an article is not governed by those rules, and the lender may ask that the article be returned at any time (Maggid Mishneh).

As the Rambam continues to explain, after the article is lent to the borrower, it is considered as his for the duration of the loan.

See Hilchot Sechirut 11:1.

For they did not personally accept any responsibility for damages that occur to the cow by forces beyond their control. The Maggid Mishneh states that they are responsible in the event of the animal's loss or theft. Since they have the license to use it, they must bear this measure of responsibility. See Chapter 7, Halachah 6, which offers a parallel situation. This ruling is quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 341:3).

As reflected in the continuation of the Halachah, this leniency applies only when the deceased did not leave an estate to his children. Note the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), which quotes an opinion that states that if the owner of the article told the heirs: “Either accept responsibility for the article in the event of its destruction by factors beyond your control, or return it,” they must heed his words.

One third Jess than the ordinary price (Bava Batra 147b). See Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 6:23, where the Rambam has a similar percentage deducted from the price of food (Maggid Mishneh).

As implied by the Rambam’s wording, this law applies whether they are left landed property or movable property. Although Bava Batra, loc. cit., the source for the Rambam’s ruling, mentions only landed property, as the Rambam mentions in several sources (e.g., Hilchot Malveh V’ Loveh 11:11), the Geonim ordained that the obligations incumbent on an estate be assessed against its movable property as well as against its landed property [Maggid Mishneh; Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 341:4)].

I.e., the full value of its worth.

For their father had accepted responsibility for the cow, and that responsibility is borne by his estate.
The Ramban, the Rashba, Rabbenu Asher and many other authorities contest the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that the obligation applies only when the heirs slaughtered the cow. If it dies because of forces beyond the sons’ control, the estate is not liable. The difference between the two instances is that when they slaughtered the cow, it could be considered negligence on their father’s part, for he should have informed them that the cow had been borrowed. Therefore, the estate is liable.
The Maggid Mishneh questions the Rambam’s ruling, noting that Bava Metzia 97b, the source for this law, quotes two different rulings of the Sages regarding this issue. These rulings revolve around a larger question: When does the obligation of the watchman begin? At the time the article is destroyed, in which instance the estate would not be liable, because at the time the obligation began, the borrower had already died. Or does it begin at the time the article was borrowed? If that was the case, the estate would be liable, because the obligation had begun in the deceased’s lifetime.
The Maggid Mishneh notes that in this instance the Rambam’s ruling appears to imply that the obligation begins at the time the article was borrowed, while in Hilchot Geneivah 3:4, the Rambam’s ruling implies that the obligation begins when the article is destroyed.
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo seeks to resolve the seeming inconsistency in the Rambam’s rulings, stating that the lien on the watchman’s property is established at the time of meshichah. The actual obligation does not begin, however, until the time the article is destroyed. In his Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 341:4), he quotes the view of the Ramban and the Rashba.

And performs meshichah to take responsibility for the article.

This reflects the rationale that governs the previous Halachah. Once a person borrows an article, it is his for the duration of the period stipulated. In the previous Halachah, the duration of the period was defined in time. In this Halachah, it is defined by the task.
Even if the borrower takes a longer time to perform the task than the lender had originally conceived, he may maintain possession until he completes the task (Seifer Me’irat Einayim 341:14).

Our translation follows the version found in the manuscript copies of the Mishneh Torah that reads pardes echad, literally, “one orchard.” The standard published texts state pardes acher, meaning “another orchard.”
The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 341:7) state that he can use the spade to hoe any orchard, even one that he does not own.

I.e., he specified “my orchards.” If, however, he asked for the spade just to “hoe orchards,” he may hoe only two orchards.

He does not have to make restitution for the damages.

Rabbenu Asher questions the Rambam’s wording, for the generosity described by the Rambam is certainly an unordinary matter. For that reason, the Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 341:6) offer a different interpretation of Bava Metzia 103a, the source for this ruling. Instead of b’tovatcha, “according to your generosity,” they state b’tovo, “while it is in good condition.”
Seifer Me’irat Einayim 341:15 states that in a situation where the person’s generosity is such that he would accept such a condition, even Rabbenu Asher and those who follow his position would accept the Rambam’s ruling. The difference between them involves only ordinary people.

Once the utensil has been destroyed, the terms of the original agreement have been fulfilled and the remnants belong to the owner. The borrower has no right to make use of them without his permission.

To the point at which it is no longer fit to contain water.

For the original agreement has been concluded.

If, however, the owner did not confirm the agreement with a kinyan, he may retract his commitment.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 341:8) add that the borrower may build the tub on any place within the owner’s property. Seifer Me’irat Einayim, however, explains that he does not have unlimited permission to use his colleague’s property, and the intent is that he may look anywhere until he finds an appropriate place to dig a well that serves his purpose.

Note the parallel in Hilchot Sechirut 6:6.

For it is not customary for a person to spend a lengthy period of time at a house of mourning. The Tur and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 341:2 quote the opinion of Rabbenu Asher that a person who borrows a garment to visit a house of mourning may keep that garment until the end of the seven-day shiv’ah period. Seifer Me’irat Einayim notes that in the laws of mourning (Yoreh De’ah 340:35), the Shulchan Aruch quotes Rabbenu Asher’s opinion without mentioning that of the Rambam.